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We revisit the old but still vibrant Post-Keynesian debate over “fully-adjusted posi-
tions”, defined by the long-run equality of actual and standard utilisation rates. The cen-
tral proposition of this paper is that in a world where different groups inside and outside 
firms have different objectives, the equality of actual and standard utilisation should not 
be treated as the (only possible) long-run equilibrium condition. The argument is illus-
trated in a model of target return pricing with conflict inflation, building on Lavoie 
(2002, 2003). A “common language” for the conflicting claims by shareholders, manag-
ers, workers is developed in terms of target profit rates, and it is shown that these con-
tradictory claims can be partly reconciled through variations in the utilisation rate. The 
analysis unifies history and equilibrium in the sense that the nature of and the adjust-
ment to the final equilibrium position depends on the objectives of the dominant social 
groups. We distinguish a “Fordist regime” and a “financialisation regime” and produce 
simulation results within a simple stock-flow consistent model that are broadly consis-
tent with the stylised facts of these distinct historical phases of capitalism.  
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One of the most important, and also criticised, features of the Kaleckian model of 
growth and distribution is the long-run endogeneity of the rate of capacity utilisation. 
This crucial property gives rise to the well-known macroeconomic paradoxes of thrift 
and of costs: a lower propensity to save and higher real wages can be consistent with 
higher growth in the long run, even in the absence of technical progress.
1 Conversely, 
when the long-run equilibrium is to be a “fully-adjusted position”, in which actual ca-
pacity utilisation must be equal to its exogenously given, normal rate, the paradox of 
costs, and in some cases also the paradox of thrift, vanish. In this paper, we discuss how 
the utilisation rate can be treated as a free, accommodating variable, when conflicting 
claims by different social groups prevent firms from operating at standard utilisation 
while simultaneously realising other important objectives. The general argument is il-
lustrated for two different configurations of capitalism, which we call “Fordism” and 
“financialisation”, and which are determined by the power relations between sharehold-
ers, managers, workers, and banks. 
The notion of an endogenous rate of capacity utilisation in the long run has been 
criticised from different angles. For Keynes, the persistent underutilisation of capacity 
was incompatible with long-run analysis, because this seemed to imply that firms leave 
additional sales opportunities unrealised.
2 A different implicit criticism of the Kaleckian 
model stems from the tradition established by Roy Harrod (Harrod, 1948), who pointed 
at the problem of instability by arguing that firms facing deviations from their standard 
utilisation rate will always react by adjusting their accumulation policies in a way that at 
the macroeconomic level increases the previous deviation, leading to either a booming 
or a crashing economy: the demand effect of investment exceeds the capacity effect. In 
the Cambridgian models by Joan Robinson and Nicholas Kaldor, this Harrodian insta-
bility is solved by the assumption that firms will succeed (accept) to raise (lower) their 
mark-up when current utilisation exceeds (falls short of) standard utilisation, thereby 
raising (lowering) the overall savings rate and slowing down (stimulating) the economy. 
Higher accumulation therefore requires a higher profit share (e.g. Robinson, 1956; Kal-
dor, 1957). Modern Marxian and Harrodian authors have proposed further adjustment 
                                                 
1 The Kaleckian model has met a renewed interest since the seminal works of Rowthorn (1981), Dutt 
(1984), Taylor (1985), Amadeo (1986) or Lavoie (1992).  
2 Keynes (1983, pp. 830-1) famously objected to Kalecki that he was “still innocent enough to be bewil-
dered by the idea that the assumption of all firms always working below capacity is consistent with ‘a 
long-run problem’”.  
  1mechanisms, involving, amongst other things, monetary policy (Duménil and Lévy, 
1999), variable rates of profit retention by firms (Shaikh, 2007), or a negative relation-
ship between the employment rate and firms’ investment propensity (Skott, 2008). As 
an overall conclusion, it may seem that one has to choose in the long run between 
Keynesian outcomes with instability, and Classical results with stability.  
A number of attempts have been made to provide an exit to this dilemma (e.g. Chick 
and Caserta, 1997; Amadeo, 1986; Lavoie, 1995, 1996, 2002, 2003; Dutt, 1990, 1997). 
In this paper, we propose an alternative analysis of steady state positions where fully-
adjusted equilibria, as defined in the traditional sense, may not necessarily be reached 
because firms have to “trade off” their utilisation target with other important objectives. 
More specifically, in a world where different groups inside and outside firms have con-
flicting objectives, the final steady state position can not be a “fully-adjusted” one for 
all social groups. In particular, shareholders’ profitability target, managers’ growth tar-
get, workers’ real wage target cannot be simultaneously realised. Starting from a rein-
terpretation of the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm, the argument is illustrated in a 
model of target return pricing with conflict inflation, building on Lavoie (2002, 2003). 
Conflict within the firm is introduced at two different levels. The first conflict opposes 
managers and shareholders and derives from the postulation of a microeconomic trade-
off between accumulation and profitability. The second conflict involves capitalists and 
workers and determines the distribution of income between profits and wages. A 
“common language” for these conflicts is developed in terms of target profit rates, and it 
is shown how the contradictory claims by the different groups can be partly reconciled 
through variations in the utilisation rate.  
Simulations with a stock-flow consistent (SFC) model produce stylised facts that are 
broadly consistent with two distinct eras of economic development in the advanced 
capitalist economies, namely “Fordism” and “financialisation”. Our analysis unifies 
history and equilibrium in the sense that the nature of and the adjustment to the final 
equilibrium position depends on the objectives of the dominant social groups. Under 
Fordism, managers and workers are the dominant groups, and firms’ profitability targets 
adjust to actual profitability. Such an adjustment mechanism has been suggested, but 
not really justified, by Lavoie (2002, 2003). Under financialisation, shareholders impose 
their objectives on managers and workers, and profitability targets are highly inflexible. 
We discuss how managers may have to react to this exogenous target and succeed in 
“adjusting reality to objectives” by adjusting their financial policies. We also consider 
  2potential limits to this adjustment process, linked to external restrictions imposed by 
banks. Generally speaking, our simulations illustrate the possibility of “equilibrium 
without equilibrium”
3 in the sense that the economy as a whole may be in “equilibrium” 
(steady state) without all the actors being in “equilibrium” (unsatisfied objectives). 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the debate over fully-adjusted 
positions in the existing literature and gives our own view on the matter. In the third 
section, we discuss the two fundamental conflicts within firms and develop the behav-
ioural equations on which our SFC model is built. Section 4 presents the simulation 
results. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Is the long-run equilibrium a fully-adjusted position? A critical review of the 
literature 
 
2.1 Kaleckian answers and their critiques  
 
The concept of a fully-adjusted position typically refers to the notion that, in the fi-
nal equilibrium, actual and standard rates of utilisation must be equal (see the survey in 
Lavoie, 1995). However, Kaleckian and other authors have put considerable effort in 
defending the long-run endogeneity of the rate of capacity utilisation, thereby trying to 
preserve a degree of relevance for Keynesian analysis in the long run. Generally speak-
ing, three types of answers to the “Classical challenge” have been given in the literature, 
and we will briefly examine some of them here. Below, we quote rather extensively 
from the respective articles, allowing us to contrast the different positions with our own 
one in the next subsection. 
Chick and Caserta (1997) are amongst those authors who place themselves in the 
field of methodological criticism, denying the relevance of long-run equilibrium analy-
sis for real world problems. This, they claim, leaves no room for history and change: 
“there is nowhere to go, nothing to learn, no scope for innovation or further evolution” 
(p. 224). Against the notion of final equilibrium they propose the new category of “pro-
visional equilibrium” which they see as relevant for the “medium run”. Faced with the 
question of whether an equilibrium rate of growth can be compatible with unadjusted 
capacity, they admit that “if what is referred to is final equilibrium, implying that all 
conflicts have been resolved and that what was there to be learned has been learned, the 
answer must be in the negative” (p. 233). By contrast, if provisional equilibrium is con-
                                                 
3 We thank Laurent Cordonnier for helping us to phrase this point. 
  3sidered the relevant level of (historical) macroeconomic analysis, there may be “(local) 
equilibrium within (global) disequilibrium” (p. 225). Yet, Chick and Caserta conclude 
that “there can be nothing permanent in an equilibrium established on these foundations, 
for there must come a time when that process of learning is formalised and tested 
against reality” (p. 234). Even though we appreciate the general proposition by Chick 
and Caserta (1997) that equilibrium is not necessarily “a state of perfect harmony” (p. 
233), their concept of “medium run” analysis seems to avoid the debate. In our view, 
heterodox economists should not abandon long-run analysis to orthodox economists, 
who quickly find refuge in the long run to deny any relevance to Keynesian ideas (see 
also Commendatore, 2006, p. 289). Besides, it seems conceptually difficult to make a 
meaningful distinction between the medium and the long run while refusing to analyse 
the endogenous forces of change linking the two together (see also Skott, 2008, p. 7, 
footnote 5). 
A second answer proposed by Kaleckian authors can be found in e.g. Amadeo 
(1986), Lavoie (1995, 1996), Lavoie et al. (2004), Park (1997), or Dutt (1997). It con-
sists in keeping the long run as the referential framework, while treating the standard 
rate of utilisation as an endogenous variable, such that a fully-adjusted position is ob-
tained as a result of standard utilisation adjusting to actual utilisation. Nevertheless, 
these analyses have been subjected to heavy criticism. Here we quote only from some 
recent contributions. For instance, Shaikh (2007, p. 10) concludes:  
-  “From a CH (presumably meaning “Classical-Harrodian”, TD, TvT) point of 
view, the claim that firms come to ‘desire’ whatever they get does nothing to 
address the problem that actual capacity utilization will be arbitrarily different 
from the lowest cost point (which includes economically necessary reserves).”   
In a similar vein, Skott (2008, p. 12) questions the endogeneity of standard utilisation by 
means of the following analogy:  
-  “I may not know exactly how long it will take me to get to work in the morning 
since weather, traffic and many other variables may influence the commuting 
time. […] Still, uncertainty of this kind and the fact that I may not have a rigor-
ously derived optimal departure time do not imply that my planned departure 
time adjusts adaptively toward the actual departure time. If I am late for class 
every day because the phone rings just as I am about to leave home, I do not re-
spond by shortening my planned commuting time.”  
  4Applying this argument to the determination of the standard rate of utilisation by firms, 
Skott (2008, p. 11) maintains that  
-  “adjustments in the target would only be justified if the experience of low actual 
utilization make firms think that low utilization has now become optimal, and 
neither Amadeo nor Lavoie presents an argument for this causal link”.  
Kaleckian authors have been criticised for not being very clear about whether they see 
standard utilisation as a convention or as a target for firms. According to the critics, if it 
is merely conventional and determined by past values of actual utilisation, it is difficult 
to see the precise behavioural importance behind the standard rate of utilisation. There-
fore, many authors have interpreted it as a target, which is linked to firms’ profit maxi-
mising behaviour: the ideal, cost minimising point of production lies below maximum 
productive capacity (e.g. Kurz, 1986; Shaikh, 2007, p. 16; Skott, 2008, p. 7). On top of 
this, in a world of uncertainty, additional reserve capacity can help firms to react to un-
foreseeable variations in demand and to deter the entry of new competitors into their 
markets.
4 Now, some authors have argued that the endogeneity of the standard rate of 
capacity utilisation may stem precisely from firms’ reaction to the time-varying risk of 
new entry by competitors into their markets. Dutt (1997), for instance, states that “firms 
may reduce their normal (or desired) capacity utilization if they expect a higher rate of 
entry than at present” (emphasis added). This assumption seems to be qualitatively simi-
lar to that by Lavoie (1995, 1996), according to which firms reduce the standard rate, 
when the actual rate of utilisation is low (Lavoie, 1996, p. 139, footnote 25). However, 
as argued by Skott (1989, p. 54; 2008, p. 13), the precise relationship between (the rate 
of change of) desired utilisation on the one hand and actual accumulation or utilisation 
on the other is not quite clear. For instance, one may as well argue that there is a nega-
tive relationship between current utilisation (or accumulation) and the desired rate of 
utilisation: the risk of new entry increases when demand is high and firms react to this 
by desiring more excess capacity, i.e. lowering the standard utilisation rate. This, how-
ever, would exacerbate, rather than reduce, the divergence between standard and actual 
rates. The debate continues (e.g. Lavoie, 2008; Shaikh, 2007; Skott, 2008).   
The last response to the Classical challenge that we will briefly review is the one 
pursued by Lavoie (2002, 2003). Standard utilisation is now treated as an exogenous 
variable, but “the long-run equilibrium is not, in general, a fully-adjusted position” 
                                                 
4 As noted by Shaikh (2007, p. 16), “the output corresponding to normal capacity utilization is perfectly 
compatible with […] a level of utilization somewhat below the exact ‘ideal’ point”. 
  5(Lavoie, 2002, p. 181), as actual utilisation may persistently deviate from its standard 
rate.
5 Lavoie’s model combines target return pricing with conflict inflation. In the long 
run, firms’ target rate of return is assumed to adjust to the actual profit rate, and this 
implies that the latter differs from the target rate of return actually incorporated into 
prices (due to workers’ real wage resistance), and hence that actual utilisation differs 
from standard utilisation. As we will argue below, this path chosen by Lavoie appears 
very promising to us, because it acknowledges the fact that it may be impossible for 
firms to realise all their different objectives, including utilisation and profit targets, as a 
result of social conflict, although Lavoie does not explicitly put the argument this way.  
 
2.2 Conflicting objectives and equilibrium adjustment: the case for endogenous 
utilisation 
 
The central claim of this paper is that in a world where different groups have (a multi-
tude of) different objectives, there is no reason to consider the equality of actual and 
standard utilisation as the (only possible) conditio sine qua non of an acceptable long-
run equilibrium. More specifically, we will provide arguments for why firms may ac-
cept to violate their utilisation target in order to realise their growth target (Fordism) or 
profitability target (financialisation), respectively. 
To some extent, our argument rejoins the methodological critique of equilibrium 
analysis by Chick and Caserta (1997). However, rather than considering situations of 
“(local) equilibrium within (global) disequilibrium”, we are more interested in the pos-
sibility of what one may call “global equilibrium despite local disequilibrium”: the sys-
tem as a whole adjusts to a long-run position, although important objectives formulated 
by the agents composing the system (e.g. desired utilisation) may not be realised. Also, 
whereas for Chick and Caserta (1997), it is learning effects that prevent equilibria from 
being permanent, we emphasise the role of conflict in preventing equilibria from being 
fully-adjusted, while allowing them to be permanent. Of course, “permanent” here does 
not necessarily imply “politically sustainable” and the long-run positions we are inter-
ested in reconcile equilibrium and history in the sense that the power relations and so-
cial institutions within which conflict takes place evolve through history. Rather, it 
means that the adjustment to the final equilibrium position is “fully completed”, without 
                                                 
5 Dutt (1990, pp. 58 et seq.) and Lavoie (1992, pp. 327 et seq.) argue that firms may accept a deviation of 
actual from standard utilisation, as long as it remains within a limited range. While this certainly is a valid 
argument, it nevertheless seems to avoid the analytical debate and has been interpreted as a step away 
from the steady-state framework (see Palumbo and Trezzini, 2003, p. 128, footnote 13).  
  6internal economic forces for change. One may therefore argue that, in this temporal 
sense, the equilibria we have in mind are no less “fully-adjusted” than those in which 
actual and standard rates of utilisation are equal. The conventional use of the term 
“fully-adjusted positions” appears somewhat unfortunate to us because it suggests that 
all of firms’ objectives are “fully” realised, as soon as they operate at a particular rate of 
capacity utilisation.  
It seems to us that, in view of our general methodological argument, the debate be-
tween Kaleckian and Classical authors over fully-adjusted positions should appear in a 
somewhat new light. For instance, Skott (2008, p. 7) argues that as soon as one abstracts 
from problems of aggregation and assumes that “firms have a well-defined objective (to 
maximise profits) […], these assumptions make it hard to conceive a steady-growth 
scenario in which firms are content to accumulate at a constant rate despite having sig-
nificantly more (or less) excess capacity than they desire. The only real question con-
cerns the determination of the desired rate of utilisation.” (p. 7) Yet, as implied (but not 
explicitly argued) by Lavoie (2002, 2003), in situations of conflict within the firm it 
may simply be impossible for firms to realise both their utilisation target and their prof-
itability target. To take up the analogy proposed by Skott (2008, p. 12), it may well be 
the case that I am not able to leave the house at the planned departure time, because the 
telephone rings every day just as I am about to leave home, because some other individ-
ual (who could be a friend, a colleague, a competitor or an enemy) demands my atten-
tion and I am not able (or willing) to disappoint her. In this case, I do not respond by 
shortening my planned commuting time, but I trade off the objective of being at work 
on time against the (apparently equally or even more important) objective (or con-
straint) to talk to my friend (or enemy). As we discuss below, the utilisation rate may 
act as an accommodating variable, allowing firms to react to inconsistent claims among 
social groups. This resort may even be particularly attractive for firms, because, given 
that they hold reserve capacity for various reasons, operating away from the desired 
utilisation rate does not necessarily imply cost-inefficient production. In other words, 
we find a microeconomic equivalent of the paradox of costs: both within the firm and at 
the macroeconomic level a variable utilisation rate reconciles conflicting objectives.  
Although we believe our argument to be quite general and potentially relevant even 
in the absence of social conflict within the firm,
6 in the remainder of the paper, we ap-
                                                 
6 Even if firms have a clearly defined final objective (to maximise profits), under conditions of uncer-
tainty they may have to compromise on different intermediary objectives allowing them to achieve their 
  7ply it only to the specific framework of conflict inflation with target return pricing, de-
veloped by Lavoie (2002, 2003). We attempt to provide some behavioural justification 
of the adjustment mechanism proposed by Lavoie, and argue that it may be empirically 
relevant for what one may want to call a “Fordist regime”. Besides, we will consider a 
different adjustment mechanism which seems more appropriate to us when it comes to 
an analysis of the current, finance-dominated period of capitalism. In both configura-
tions of the model, a “fully-adjusted position” (in the traditional sense) cannot be 
reached as a result of conflicting claims by workers, managers, shareholders, and credi-
tors. 
 
3. Conflicting claims and the realisation of firms’ objectives: micro- and macro-
economic perspectives 
 
In this section, we develop some core behavioural equations on which we will then 
build our SFC model. We reassess two types of conflict reflecting the two dimensions 
of all macroeconomic Post-Keynesian models of growth and distribution. In the first 
conflict, managers and shareholders confront their respective claims regarding the ori-
entation of firms’ investment policies, and in the second conflict, workers express their 
distributional aspirations and confront them to firms’ mark-up targets. Building on 
Lavoie (2002, 2003), we establish a “common language” for managers, workers and 
shareholders and address the question of the realisation of firms’ objectives at the mac-
roeconomic level as well as the implications for the debate over fully-adjusted positions. 
 
3.1 Accumulation policy and the manager-shareholder conflict 
 
We analyse the shareholder-manager conflict in terms of the traditional Post-Keynesian 
theory of the firm, extended for financialisation considerations.
7 The individual firm 
faces two distinct constraints, represented in figure 1 by the expansion frontier and the 
finance frontier. The expansion frontier shows the expected profitability of the firm’s 
investment possibilities. It is assumed to be upward sloping for low levels of accumula-
                                                                                                                                               
final objective. For instance, both reserve capacity and a low leverage ratio are means for firms to deal 
with the imponderabilities of the future (for a discussion of fundamental uncertainty, see Davidson, 
1972). It may, for instance, be the case that current utilisation exceeds desired utilisation but that the firm 
is nevertheless reluctant to increase accumulation because this may require it to increase leverage to an 
irresponsibly high level. In other words, real fragility (risk of new entry or inability to respond to sudden 
increases in demand) may have to be traded off with financial fragility (risk of default due to high lever-
age). See also the discussion of our simulation results below. 
7 See Lavoie (1992) for an exposition of the traditional Post-Keynesian theory of the firm, and Crotty 
(1990), Stockhammer (2005-6) and Dallery (2008) for an extension to financialised firms. 
  8tion (due to economies of scale and scope, etc.), and downward sloping for higher levels 
(due to technical and logistical inefficiencies, etc.) (see Lavoie, 1992, pp. 114 et seq.). 
The finance frontier indicates the maximum rate of accumulation that the firm can fi-
nance with a given profit rate. In accordance with Kalecki’s (1937) “principle of in-
creasing risk”, the slope of the finance frontier is positively related to the firm’s lever-
age ratio.  
 
Figure 1: The Post-Keynesian firm and the shareholder-manager conflict 
B Managers’ preferences 
 
 
Points A and B in figure 1 indicate the respective preferences of shareholders and 
managers in terms of accumulation and profitability. As is traditionally assumed in 
Post-Keynesian analysis (Galbraith, 1967; Wood, 1975), managers mainly seek growth, 
as a means to ensure the firm’s survival by increasing its power, limiting uncertainty, 
etc. At the opposite side, shareholders seek profitability for intuitive reasons: because 
they hold diversified portfolios, they are not really committed to the long-term perspec-
tives and the survival of individual firms (e.g. Crotty, 1990). The shareholder-manager 
conflict arises from the growth-profit trade-off, as materialised in the downward sloping 
segment of the firm’s expansion frontier in figure 1. For shareholders, the accumulation 
decision is subordinated to the profitability target, whereas managers are interested in 
profitability mainly as an intermediate objective and as a means to finance a desired rate 
of growth.
8 In figure 1, when shareholders fully impose their preferences on managers, 
                                                 
8 Lavoie (1992, p. 106) tells us with respect to the objectives of the firm as a whole: “Put briefly, growth 













  9firms will target a high profit rate, rsh, which requires a low accumulation rate, gsh. In 
the example, it is therefore shareholders’ preferences, and not the finance constraint, 
which determine firms’ accumulation policies. Conversely, when managers are fully 
dominant, the finance constraint is the limiting factor for the firm’s accumulation deci-
sion, gsm, as was traditionally assumed by the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm. Man-
agers’ profitability target, rsm, therefore incorporates the finance constraint and adjusts 
passively to the point of intersection between the expansion frontier and the finance 
frontier. Despite this very different appreciation of the growth-profit trade-off by share-
holders and managers, it is possible to express firms’ objectives in terms of a target 
profit rate, rsf, which is a weighted average of the profit rate desired by shareholders, rsh, 
and the profit rate, rsm, which managers would require in order to be able to finance ac-
cumulation rate gsm:   
 
(1)  sm sh sf r r r ) 1 ( 1 1 δ δ − + = ,   with  1 0 1 ≤ ≤δ . 
 
Based on these microeconomic considerations, a general macroeconomic investment 
function can be formulated as:  
 
(2)  .  1 3 1 2 1 , 1 0 / − − − + − − = = u LEV r K I g sf
i γ γ γ γ
 
Equation (2) reflects the three components of firms’ accumulation decision: the “prefer-
ence side” (given by the manager-owner conflict), the “constraint side” (given by the 
finance frontier), and the “opportunities side” (given by the expansion frontier). Firms’ 
investment decisions are constrained by the preference for profitability, rsf, or by an 
external financing constraint, indicated by the leverage ratio, LEV, which proxies the 
slope of the finance frontier in figure 1. Investment is also assumed to be positively re-
lated to the utilisation rate, u, as an increase in aggregate demand can be represented as 
an outward shift of the expansion frontier of the individual firm. In short, we argue that 
the investment function proposed above can be seen as directly grounded in the Post-
Keynesian theory of the firm. Furthermore, it can be argued that during the Fordist pe-
riod, accumulation has been constrained mainly by the availability of finance, while in 
the financialisation period, shareholders’ preferences have been the main limiting fac-
                                                                                                                                               
managerial firms, but in the new institutional configuration of finance-dominated firms, it is often held 
that profits are no longer a mean to an end, but they become an end in itself. 
  10tor. For simplicity, in what follows we shall assume γ1 = 0 and γ2 > 0 in equation (2) for 
the Fordist regime, and γ1 > 0 and γ2 = 0 for the financialisation regime. 
 
3.2 Distribution and the manager-worker conflict 
 
We have just seen that the owner-manager conflict can be expressed in terms of target 
profit rates, although the true objectives of shareholders and managers are different 
ones. For workers, the third group within the firm, the true objective is a real wage rate 
or a wage share in value added. However, following the target return framework with 
conflict inflation proposed by Lavoie (2002, 2003), we are able to translate the wage 
share target into a “profit rate target”, rsw, as well. The conflict over distribution is then 
a conflict between workers’ aspirations, rsw, and the result of the manager-shareholder 
conflict,  rsf. In our model, shareholders’ claims strongly affect income distribution, 
since they are integrated a priori in the process of wage bargaining.  
Formally, the conflict inflation framework with target return pricing can be summa-
rised as follows. Firms set a margin, θ, on unit labour costs, wl, which allows them to 
obtain a target rate of profit, rs, provided the rate of capacity utilisation is at its normal 
level, us, which is treated here as exogenously given. As shown by Lavoie (2003, pp. 
57-8), firms’ mark-up pricing procedure can be expressed as the general cost-plus pric-
ing formula given by equation (3), with the profit margin being determined by equation 
(4), where   is the capital-full capacity output-ratio. From national account-
ing it then follows that the profit rate seen from the cost side, r
pot Y K / = σ
pc, can be written as in 
equation (5). 
 
(3)  () wl p θ + = 1 ,  
 
(4)   () ( ) σ θ s s s r u u 1 − = + /,  
 
(5)  .  s s
pc u u r r / =
 
Effective price changes decided by firms depend on the divergence between their 
target profit rate, rsf, and the target profit rate actually incorporated into prices, rs, as 
well as on their ability to pass through expected wage increases on prices: 
 
(6)  ( )
e
s sf w r r p ) )
2 1 1 Ψ Ψ + − =
− , 
 
  11where  p )
is the rate of price inflation, 
e w )
is the expected nominal wage inflation, and Ψ1 
and Ψ2 are indicators of firms’ bargaining power. Analogously, workers obtain nominal 




sw s p r r w ) )
2 1 1 Ω Ω + − = − . 
 
In equilibrium, where wage and price inflation are equal and the real wage constant, 
we have:  
 
(8)  sw sf s r r r Ω Ψ + = ,   with  1 = + Ω Ψ . 
 
We have to bear in mind that the profit rate actually incorporated into prices, rs, is 
not an effective profit rate experienced by firms, but determines the actual distribution 
of income based on the balance of power between firms and workers, with the profit 
share being defined as  ( ) θ θ + = 1 / h . As shown by equation (5), the actual profit rate 
depends on aggregate demand (u). 
 
3.3 The macroeconomic closure and the realisation of firms’ objectives 
 
Until here, we have seen how conflicting claims are formulated. Next, we have to study 
how these objectives can be met (or not) at the macroeconomic level. Conveniently for 
our purposes, the standard Kaleckian model allows one to formulate the macroeconomic 
closure in terms of profit rates, considered from the cost side and from the demand side. 
The rate of profit seen from the cost side, r
pc, is given by equation (5), while the effec-
tive demand constraint, r
ed, is obtained by confronting the accumulation function from 
equation (2) with a macroeconomic saving function, which in our model takes the fol-
lowing standard form: 
 
(9)  .  1 2 1 1 1 ] ) )( 1 [( / − − − − + − − − = = q LEV i LEV i r s r K S g l l f
s β β
 
It is assumed that workers do not save, such that total saving relative to capital stock 
depends on the profit rate, firms retention ratio, sf, and interest obligations given by the 
interest rate, il, set by banks, and the leverage ratio, and rentiers propensity to consume 
out of capital income, β1, and out of wealth, β2 (Tobin’s q being defined here as house-
holds’ net worth relative to capital stock).  
  12If we wish to set up system dynamics, we have to ask what firms’ objectives really 
are. The debate over fully-adjusted positions in the existing literature always refers to 
standard utilisation. For us, given the centrality of the profit rate in the two conflicts 
opposing shareholders, managers and workers, it appears more appropriate to structure 
the debate around target profit rates. However, from the preceding discussion, it can be 
immediately seen that fully-adjusted positions in the traditional sense may be systemati-
cally prevented by the presence of conflicting claims. As can be seen from equations (5) 
and (8), operating at standard utilisation (u* = us) allows the realisation of firms’ profit-
ability objectives (r* = rsf), if and only if there is no conflict over income distribution (rs 
= rsf = rsw). As soon as workers have some power to oppose firms’ “distribution objec-
tive” (rsf > rs > rsw), firms have to operate above standard utilisation (u* > us) in order to 
reach their profitability objectives (r* = rsf). We may arrive at a “fully-adjusted posi-
tion” regarding profitability, but this does not coincide with a fully-adjusted position in 
the usual sense. The rate of utilisation is still seen as a free variable, and this ensures 
that firms’ and workers’ objectives are not fully contradictory, as variations in utilisation 
allow them to partly reconcile their respective profitability and distribution targets.  
If we make r* = rsf a condition for long-run equilibrium, implying that firms achieve 
their profitability, or growth, target, two different types of adjustment are possible. In 
Lavoie (2002, 2003), firms’ profit target rate adjusts to the actual profit rate, as long as 
objectives are not met. For us, this reveals a managerial, or “Fordist”, way of thinking 
the firm by which profitability objectives are subject to growth objectives, and where, 
according to Lavoie (1992, p. 107), “shareholders play a purely passive role”. In the 
framework of our model, this translates into δ1 = 0 in equation (1), and the adjustment 
process proposed by Lavoie (2002, 2003) becomes: 
 
(10)  ) * ( 1 , 1 1 − − − = Δ = Δ sm sm sf r r r r ρ . 
 
Equation (10) implies that, in equilibrium, firms prefer to operate at standard profit-
ability rather than at standard utilisation. While Lavoie (2002, 2003) does not provide 
much of an economic rationale for this adjustment mechanism, we may derive a “Ford-
ist interpretation” from our discussion of the Post-Keynesian theory of the firm above. 
In the Fordist case, firms (managers) derive their profitability target from their growth 
target. As noted elsewhere by Lavoie (2004, p. 52), “for those firms that attempt to 
maximise their growth rate, the target rate of return which should be incorporated into 
  13prices is the one that is determined by the intersection of the expansion frontier and the 
finance frontier” (our translation). However, in the present model, where firms face the 
conflict with workers, they cannot incorporate their target rate of return into prices. 
Therefore, as formalised in equation (10), firms adjust their target rate of return to the 
actual profit rate allowed for by demand conditions. Suppose there is a permanent in-
crease in demand, reflected in an increase in actual utilisation and profit rates, and, 
graphically, in an upward shift of the expansion frontier for the individual firm. Manag-
ers realise that a higher accumulation rate becomes possible, but that, seen from the fi-
nancing side, this requires a permanently higher profit rate. Then, by adjusting their 
target rate of return upwards, they claim a larger profit share, but their preference for 
higher growth also requires an increase in utilisation.
9 After all, capitalism remains a 
conflictive system even under Fordism, and firms’ quest for growth (market shares) as 
well as the distributional struggle with workers prevails over concerns about the optimal 
utilisation rate. Of course, there may be some maximum utilisation rate that managers 
are willing to accept. 
In the era of financialisation, shareholders seem to expect their profitability claims 
to prevail over all other objectives. Shareholders impose their interests on managers (for 
simplicity, assume δ1 = 1 in equation (1)), who then attempt to transfer these claims on 
workers in the wage bargaining process. In contrast to Fordism, the “financial nexus” 
now dominates the “wage nexus”, as French Regulationist authors may put it. In a fi-
nance-dominated economy, shareholders express very inflexible claims, and they expect 
these claims to be met. Equation (10) no longer holds. Rather, whenever the effective 
profit rate is below shareholders’ claims, managers are placed in a situation of failure, 
and they cannot afford to remain passive in an environment where unsuccessful man-
agements can be easily overthrown by shareholders. We therefore propose a simple ad-
justment mechanism that reflects shareholders’ pressure on management, given by 
equations (11) and (12):  
 
(11)  ) * ( 1 1 , 2 − − − − = Δ r r s sf f δ , 
 
(12)  ) * ( 1 1 , 3 − − − − = Δ r r x sf δ , 
 
                                                 
9 As noted by Lavoie (2002, 2003) and Missaglia (2007, p. 79), the adjustment process described by equa-
tion (10) is stable due to  .  0 / < s dr dr
  14where sf is firms’ retention rate of profits, and x is the proportion of investment financed 
through new equity issues.
10 As long as shareholders’ profitability claims are not real-
ised, shareholders require that managers adjust their financial policies and distribute a 
larger part of profits and get into debt to buy back firms’ shares. At the microeconomic 
level, this is the only way for managers to increase the rate of return on equity and to 
signal to shareholders that they are confident with regard to firms’ future profit oppor-
tunities. Paradoxically, as will be shown in the next section, it is precisely this micro-
economic mechanism which allows firms, under certain conditions, to realise the profit 
rate expected by shareholders at the macroeconomic level, as a higher rate of distributed 
profits increases aggregate consumption by rentiers and hence profits.  
 
Figure 2: Conflicting claims and the realisation of firms’ objectives 
 





10 In insightful papers, Charles (2008) and Shaikh (2007) also introduce adjustment mechanisms involv-
ing firms’ retention ratio, but they do so in quite different ways. For Charles (2008, p. 9), managers target 
some level of the retention ratio in order “to preserve their financial autonomy”. When debt increases, 
managers are able to cut dividends and to increase their retention ratio in order to control uncertainty. For 
us, in a financialised economy, the causality is reversed: managers are obliged to distribute more divi-
dends by means of increasing debt. For Shaikh (2007), the retention ratio adjusts to the gap between nor-
mal and actual utilisation rates. But the underlying economic rationale does not appear very clear to us. 
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  15The overall dynamics of the model are summarised in figure 2. On the left hand 
side, we recall the different profit rates and their link with aggregate demand dynamics. 
On the right hand side, we reproduce the sequential graphical representations of these 
processes. Indeed, we have four profit rates reflecting the respective claims of three 
social groups: rsh and rsm determine the profit rate pursued by firms, rsf, and rsw stands 
for workers’ claims in the wage bargaining process. The confrontation of firms’ objec-
tives and workers’ claims, weighted by their respective bargaining power, gives rise to 
the effective distribution of income between wages and profits, as reflected in the profit 
rate effectively incorporated into prices, rs. Then, the effective demand constraint, r
ed, 
depends on investment, g
i, and saving, g
s, which are influenced by firms’ retention ratio, 
sf, and equity issuances, x, and the profit share, determined by rs. The effective profit 
rate results from the confrontation of the effective demand constraint with the profit rate 
seen from the cost side, r
pc. Under Fordism, the effective profit rate feeds back into 
firms’ target profit rate, while under financialisation dividend payments and share buy-
backs may provide a means to adjust actual to target profitability. It can be clearly seen 
in the figure that the objectives u = us and r = rsf are mutually exclusive due to rsf ≠ rsw. 
 
4. Conflicting claims and adjustment processes: simulations with a stock-flow con-
sistent model 
 
Based on the arguments developed in the previous section, we have built a simple stock-
flow consistent macroeconomic model, following the methodology developed by 
Wynne Godley and Marc Lavoie (Lavoie and Godley, 2001-2; Godley and Lavoie, 
2007). The SFC framework is particularly appropriate for long-run equilibrium analysis 
since it allows simulating the traverse from one steady state, or final long-run position, 
to another, while clearly showing the adjustment processes towards these final equilib-
ria.  
The basic structure of the model is very close to the one developed by Lavoie and 
Godley (2001-2). There are three sectors in our closed, private model economy: private 
households (workers and rentiers), firms, and banks, and there are two financial assets: 
money and equities. The main extension is that we integrate the conflict inflation 
framework and alternative types of adjustment mechanisms into the model to deal with 
the question of fully-adjusted positions. While all the crucial behavioural equations of 
the model have already been discussed in the previous section, the full set of equations 
is provided in the Appendix.  
  16For our simulations, we make two different sets of assumptions regarding the in-
vestment decision and the equilibrium adjustment mechanism, reflecting the balance of 
power between workers, managers, shareholders and bankers. The first frame (“Ford-
ism”) is essentially similar to the model proposed by Lavoie (2002, 2003). In the second 
frame, we analyse a “financialisation regime”.  
 
4.1 Lavoie’s (2002, 2003) model: a “Fordist” interpretation 
 
The term ”Fordism” is used to describe the very particular accumulation regime dur-
ing the thirty-year period after World War II, where workers were in a favourable bar-
gaining position and where economic growth was strong and the wage share showed a 
tendency to increase.
11 Therefore, in our first simulation, we will give a positive shock 
to workers’ bargaining strength, given by Ω1 in equation (7). As discussed above, we 
assume δ1 = 0 and γ1 = 0 in equations (1) and (2): managers fully impose their objec-
tives on shareholders. This is the Galbraithian “technostructure”. Managers’ investment 
decisions are constraint by aggregate demand and the availability of finance and are 
therefore relatively sensitive to the leverage ratio, due to either liquidity constraints or a 
reluctant attitude towards rising debt ratios. At the same time, because managers are 
above all interested in growth, they are very pragmatic in the formulation of their profit-
ability target, as formalised in equation (10). 
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11 The “Fordist accumulation regime” has been extensively described by the French Regulation School, 
following Aglietta (1976). See also Marglin and Schor (1990).  
  17Figure 3 shows our simulation results for this configuration of the model. The left 
part shows the positive impact of an increased wage share on growth, utilisation and 
profitability. We see that managers’ (firms’) profitability target gradually adjusts to the 
actual profit rate. Clearly, the paradox of costs holds, and we are in a “stagnationist de-
mand regime” ( 0 / < ∂ ∂ s r u ) with “wage-led growth” ( 0 / < ∂ ∂ s r g ), as described by 
Bhaduri and Marglin (1990). Since the positive effect of increased utilisation on the 
profit rate overwhelms the negative effect of a decreasing profit share, we are also in a 
regime of “cooperative capitalism” ( 0 / < ∂ ∂ s r r ). It can also be expected that unem-
ployment decreases.
12  
Our results also permit us to re-emphasise that the growth-profit trade-off is only a 
microeconomic trade-off. In this Fordist case, profits and growth go hands in hands at 
the macroeconomic level. First, accumulation increases due to increased demand, and 
then firms increase their profitability (growth) objective. By assumption, this has no 
direct effect whatsoever in the investment function.
13 However, the higher actual rate of 
profit and the financing requirements linked to the higher accumulation rate encourage 
managers to reformulate their distributional claims vis-à-vis workers. In technical terms, 
after the initial decrease in the slope of the w
) -curve in figure 2, the  -curve gradually 
shifts upwards with the increase in firms’ target rate of return, thereby mitigating 
somewhat the distributional effects of workers’ enhanced bargaining power.  
p ˆ
Our simulation results may provide an additional argument for why firms would ac-
cept a deviation from their utilisation target. As argued above, the standard rate of utili-
sation can be seen to derive from some optimality condition linked to firms’ position in 
the goods market (cost-efficient production, ability to respond to variations in demand 
and to deter new entrants). However, this optimality condition may have to be traded off 
not only with the profit rate (growth) target, but also with firms’ concerns regarding 
their financial position (see our argument in footnote 6). As can be seen from the right 
part of figure 3, both the leverage ratio and Tobin’s q fall following the initial shock. 
Firms certainly did not care much about Tobin’s q during Fordism. However, a drop in 
                                                 
12 In the model, we somewhat crudely assume that the unemployment rate is inversely related to the utili-
sation rate. We have also introduced a simple feedback effect linking (changes in) the unemployment rate 
with workers’ distributional claims and bargaining strength (see Appendix). 
13 We have also conducted simulations with a positive coefficient on target profitability in the investment 
function. With this alternative configuration, aggregate demand is still stagnationist and growth wage-led, 
but the profit rate is negatively affected by a higher wage share (“conflictive capitalism” in the Bhaduri 
and Marglin, 1990, sense). This result is reminiscent of the historical experience of the end of Fordism 
with an emerging pressure on firms’ accumulation policy stemming from increasing profitability claims.  
  18the leverage ratio should be highly appreciated by managers because it reduces financial 
fragility and the risk of default. We may therefore argue that managers accept the devia-
tion of utilisation from target because it allows them not only to achieve a higher profit 
rate, but also to operate at a lower leverage ratio.
14  
 
4.2 Financialisation I: the “paradox of greed” 
 
In the financialisation era,
15 shareholders impose their views on firms’ policies. For 
simplicity, we assume δ1 = 1 in equation (1) so that shareholders’ profitability target 
becomes the target of firms. Besides, equation (10) does not hold anymore. The share-
holder-manager conflict delivers the target profit rate for firms, which then gives rise to 
firms’ investment decision and is also transferred to the wage bargaining process. Tar-
get profitability becomes the dominant factor in the investment function (large γ1 in 
equation (2)), and for simplicity we assume that there are no financing constraints (γ2 = 
0 in equation (2)) implying that firms always operate above the point of intersection 
between the expansion and finance frontiers in figure 1. In terms of the conflict over 
income distribution, managers simply discharge the claims formulated by shareholders 
on workers. This sequential translation of shareholders’ claims refers to the theory of 
risk transfer (e.g. Aglietta and Rebérioux, 2004).  
 



























                                                 
14 Of course, this rather informal argument relies on an inverse relationship between the rates of profit and 
utilisation on the one hand, and the leverage ratio on the other. However, such a configuration, which is 
reminiscent of Steindl’s (1958) “paradox of debt”, seems particularly relevant for the Fordist regime (see 
also Lavoie, 1995; Hein, 2006, 2007). 
15 See e.g. Boyer (2000), Krippner (2005), Palley (2008), van Treeck (2007), Hein and van Treeck (2008) 
for discussions of financialisation. 
  19We first simulate the effects of an increase in shareholders’ profitability claims, rsh, 
in the absence of the adjustment mechanisms given by equations (11) and (12) above 
(see figure 4). In this case, shareholders will encounter a problem of realisation of their 
claims. Imposing their increased profitability target on managers and workers implies a 
direct negative effect on accumulation through the investment function, and an indirect 
one via the increase in the profit share. Not surprisingly for Keynesians, this depresses 
growth, utilisation and profit rates. In the absence of an adjustment mechanism, we find 
a “paradox of greed”: the more shareholders want, the less they get.
16  
 
4.3 Financialisation II: variable financial policies, rentiers’ consumption and in-
debtedness 
 
Financialisation is not in reality so depressive, so we have to take into account some 
adjustment mechanisms allowing the economy to provide shareholders with what they 
want. Shareholders’ claims can be fulfilled in reality, but this can only be the result of 
an unintended macroeconomic mechanism. Figure 5 summarises the dynamics of the 
model, when the adjustment processes introduced in equations (11) and (12) above, 
fully operate. 
In the upper left part, we first observe a tendency towards depression after the initial 
shock. As before, higher profitability claims imply a direct drop in accumulation and an 
increase in the profit share, and hence a drop in utilisation, growth and profit rates. But 
then firms increasingly distribute profits to rentiers and buy back their shares (bottom 
left part). As a consequence, firms become increasingly dependent on debt financing 
and the leverage ratio, and hence interest obligations, increase (upper right). This further 
redistributes income to rentiers, and their consumption out of dividends, interests and 
wealth, leads to a recovery in profit and utilisation rates (upper left). The accumulation 
rate is then positively affected by the increase in the utilisation rate, but this does not 
compensate for the negative effect of increased profitability claims.
17 Indeed, we see 
that the virtual economy (personal net worth, Tobin’s q) and the real economy (accumu-
                                                 
16 This fundamental micro-macro divide seems to be neglected in much of the literature on “financialisa-
tion” (see van Treeck, 2008, or Skott and Ryoo, 2008, for a critique). 
17 The expansionary effects of the higher dividend payout ratio and share buybacks crucially depend on 
the coefficients on the leverage ratio in the investment function and on Tobin’s q in the savings function. 
We have assumed for simplicity that investment is not finance-constrained in the financialisation regime. 
However, when this assumption is lifted, a higher dividend payout ratio and share buybacks can be con-
tractionary under certain conditions. See van Treeck (2007), Skott and Ryoo (2008) and Hein and van 
Treeck (2008) for a discussion. 
  20lation, output) “move in opposite directions”, a possibility analysed in a different setting 
by Bhaduri et al. (2006).  
In the new steady state, we are in a “fully-adjusted position” from the point of view 
of shareholders, the effective profit rate being equal to their target rate. Although firms 
cannot operate at the standard, cost-efficient rate of utilisation, the economy is in 
“global equilibrium” because of shareholders being in “equilibrium”. 
 




















































The macroeconomic phenomenon found here reminds of “Kalecki’s Law” stating 
that “capitalists earn what they spent”. However, under conditions of financialisation, 
capitalists’ expenditures are no longer concentrated on accumulation, but on consump-
tion out of distributed profits and wealth.
18 Therefore, the accumulation regime of fi-
nancialisation is a regime of “profits without investment” (Cordonnier, 2006). This re-
gime can be sustainable but it requires a substantial rise in firms’ indebtedness, which 
allows firms to buy back more shares and to distribute more dividends. This depend-
                                                 
18 See Cordonnier (2006) for this original reassessment of Kalecki’s Law, and van Treeck (2007) for an 
extension within a stock-flow consistent model. 
  21ency towards debt makes the economy increasingly fragile, and, as we discuss below, 
highly dependent on banks’ willingness to grant credit to firms. 
 
4.4 Financialisation III: the “glass ceiling of profitability” 
 
In our last simulation, we consider the possibility that the operation of the adjustment 
processes illustrated above is limited by means of a shareholder-creditor conflict, in-
volving a maximum leverage ratio tolerated by banks. In their enlightening contribution, 
Cordonnier and Van de Velde (2008) assess the sustainability of ever-increasing profit-
ability claims in the era of financialisation. Because the realisation of profits depends on 
capitalist expenditure on investment and consumption out of distributed profits, the 
maximum level of profitability that may be realised is given by the extent to which 
banks are willing to grant loans to firms. If shareholders express claims that require lev-
erage to go beyond this maximum level, the system is confronted with a “glass ceiling 
of profitability”. For Cordonnier and Van de Velde (2008), this will lead the economy 
into a depressionary spiral and firms will increasingly restrict their investment spending. 
Here, we adopt a different hypothesis. If shareholders’ claims are unachievable, share-
holders will have to accept the ultimate dominance of banks, and the economy will 
gravitate around the maximum leverage ratio tolerated by banks.
19 The adjustment 
mechanisms from equations (11) and (12) are generalised in equations (11’) and (12’). 
When the maximum leverage ratio, or “glass ceiling of profitability” is hit, banks will 
oblige firms to reduce their dividend payout ratio and share buybacks. Managers do as 
much as they can to satisfy shareholders, but ultimately creditors are the dominant ac-
tors in the economy.  
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(12’)  ) ( ) * ( 1 31 1 1 , 3 − − − − + − − = Δ lev levc r r x sf δ δ , 































                                                 
19 We could also imagine an endogenous maximum leverage ratio to deal with cyclical animal spirits by 
banks (Minsky, 1986). Once reached, it could continuously drop and lead the economy into the depres-
sionary spiral described by Cordonnier and Van de Velde (2008). 
  22The simulation results are shown in figure 6. We record essentially the same dynam-
ics as in figure 5, but the adjustment towards shareholders’ profitability claims is not 
fully completed. In the new steady state, the economy as a whole is in “global equilib-
rium” without shareholders being in “equilibrium”, but with banks imposing their ob-
jectives. 
 





























In this paper, we have reassessed the debate over “fully-adjusted positions” in a con-
flicting claims framework with target return pricing. We have argued that the adjust-
ment to long-run equilibrium positions should not be framed exclusively in terms of the 
standard rate of utilisation. Rather, firms may have to compromise on different objec-
tives, in particular when there are conflicting claims by different social groups inside 
and outside firms. We have applied this general argument to two different historical 
configurations of capitalism, which we have loosely defined as “Fordism” and “finan-
cialisation”. Building on Lavoie (2002, 2003), we have developed a “common lan-
guage” for shareholders, managers, and workers, allowing us to analyse the different 
conflicts opposing these groups in terms of target profit rates. We have been able to 
produce simulation results that seem broadly consistent with the stylised facts of both 
the Fordist and the financialisation periods.  
We hope that our argument can be seen as another step towards a reconciliation be-
tween long-run equilibrium analysis and more historically oriented macroeconomics. In 
our model, the nature of and the adjustment to the final equilibrium position is histori-
cally-determined and depends on the objectives of the dominant social groups. In the 
  23Fordist era, managers and workers were the leading groups. Managers were dominant 
vis-à-vis shareholders in their investment decisions, which were oriented towards ex-
pansion rather than profitability and only constrained by aggregate demand and the 
availability of finance, but not by shareholders’ profitability claims. Workers imposed 
increases in the wage share, and firms resisted workers’ claims only to the degree to 
which actual profitability increased. Firms adjusted their profitability targets to actual 
profitability. With financialisation, shareholders formulate inflexible profitability objec-
tives, which are imposed on both managers and workers.
20 We have discussed a simple 
macroeconomic mechanism that may actually allow shareholders to achieve their target. 
This shareholder-dominated long-run equilibrium is, however, subject to the conflicting 
objectives of the banking sector, which may wish to keep firms’ debt ratios below some 
maximum level.   
Clearly, much more work needs to be done. Both our “Fordist” interpretation of the 
adjustment mechanism proposed by Lavoie (2002, 2003), and our particular view of 
conflicting claims in the financialisation regime are incomplete. For instance, our at-
tempt to formulate the various objectives of different actors in terms of target profit 
rates may seem simplistic. Therefore, one may wish to consider the implications of 
shareholders targeting some measure of financial profitability (earnings per share, return 
on equity, etc.) rather than a real profit rate. Also, adding further actors and sectors to 
the model may increase the dimension of conflict in the economy. For instance, as noted 
by Duménil and Lévy (1999), the Central Bank may not tolerate every rate of capacity 
utilisation and the potential implications for the rate of inflation. Similarly, the objec-
tives of government and the foreign sector could be considered.
21
Despite these lacunae, we hope that our work contributes to opening up the debate 
over fully-adjusted positions, which has been intriguing heterodox economists for so 
long.  
 
                                                 
20 Epstein (1992) has also discussed different historical configurations in terms of capital-labour and 
industry-finance relations. 
21 Missaglia (2007) has extended the framework proposed by Lavoie (2002, 2003) to the open economy. 
  24Appendix: Model variables and equations  
 
Endogenous variables: 
c_r: Total real consumption 
cg: Capital gains 
cg_exp: Expected capital gains 
cons: Total consumption 
cr: Rentiers’ consumption  
cr_r: Rentiers’ real consumption 
cw_r: Workers’ real consumption 
e_d: Demand for equities 
e_exp: Expected stock market value  
e_s: Supply of equities 
fb: Bank profits 
fd: Dividends  
ft: Total profits 
fu: Undistributed profits  
g: Accumulation rate 
gy: Growth rate of rentier income  
gy_r: Real growth rate of rentier income  
h: Profit share 
i: Investment 
i_r: Real investment 
il: Banks’ lending rate 
k: Capital stock 
k_r: Real capital stock  
l_s: Total loans (supply) 
lev: Firms’ leverage ratio  
levc: Maximum leverage ratio tolerated by banks 
lf: Firms’ loans outstanding  
m_d: Money deposits (demand) 
m_s: Money deposits (supply) 
n: Employed workers  
npot: Potential employment 
p: Price level 
pe: Price of equity 
pinfl: Price inflation  
pinfl_exp: Expected price inflation 
q: Tobin’s q 
r: Profit rate  
re: Rate of return on equity 
re_r: Real rate of return on equity  
rl: Banks’ real lending rate 
rm: Banks’ real deposit rate 
rs: Target rate of return actually incorporated into prices  
rsf: Firms’ rarget rate of return  
rsw: Workers’ target rate of return  
theta: Mark-up of firms 
u: Utilisation rate 
un: Unemployed workers  
  25ur: Unemployment rate 
v: Rentiers’ net worth 
v_exp: Rentiers’ expected net worth  
w: Wage rate  
w_r: Real wage rate 
wb: Wage bill 
wb_r: Real wage bill 
winfl: Wage inflation  
winfl_exp: Expected wage inflation 
ws: Wage share 
y: Output  
y_r: Real output 
ydr: Rentiers’ disposable income 
ydr_exp: Rentiers’ expected disposable income 
ydr_r: Rentiers’ real disposable income 
ydr_r_exp: Rentiers’ expected real disposable income 
ypot: Potential output  
ypot_r: Real potential output 
 
Exogenous variables and parameters: 
beta1: Propensity to consume out of rentier disposable income  
beta2: Propensity to consume out of net worth  
delta1: Indicator of shareholders’ power 
delta2: Speed of adjustment of dividend payout ratio to profitability gap 
delta21: Speed of adjustment of dividend payout ratio to excess leverage 
delta3: Speed of adjustment of share buybacks to profitability gap 
delta31: Speed of adjustment of share buybacks to excess leverage 
gamma0: Autonomous investment 
gamma1: Investment response to profitability target 
gamma2: Investment response to leverage ratio 
gamma3: Investment response to utilisation 
im: Banks’ deposit rate 
lambda0: Autonomous preference for equity 
lambda1: Response in preference for equity to deposit rate 
lambda2: Response in preference for equity to rate of return on equity 
lambda3: Indicator of transactions demand for money 
mju: Labour productivity 
omega1: Response of wage increases to frustrated claims by workers 
omega10: Autonomous bargaining power of workers 
omega11: Effect of unemployment rate on workers’ bargaining power  
omega2: Response of wage inflation to expected price inflation  
psi1: Response of price increases to frustrated claims by firms 
psi2: Response of price inflation to expected wage inflation  
rho1: Speed of adjustment of firms’ profitability target to actual profitability 
rho2: Sensibility of workers’ claims to changes in unemployment rate  
rsh: Target profit rate of shareholders 
rsm: Target profit rate of managers  
sf: Firms’ retention rate  
sigma: Capital-to-full capacity ratio  
thetab: Banks’ markup on interest rate 
  26us: Standard utilisation rate 
x: Ratio of net equity issues to investment 
 
Distribution and inflation:  
rs = (us - (us / p)*(w / mju))/sigma 
w = (omega1*(rs(-1) - rsw(-1)) + omega2*pinfl_exp)*w(-1)+w(-1) 
p = (psi1*(rsf(-1) - rs(-1)) + psi2*winfl_exp)*p(-1)+p(-1) 
omega1 = omega10 - omega11*ur(-1) 
w_r = w/p 
winfl = (w- w(-1))/w(-1) 
winfl_exp = winfl(-1) 
pinfl = (p- p(-1))/p(-1) 
pinfl_exp = pinfl(-1) 
rsw = rsw(-1) + rho2*(ur(-1) - ur(-2)) 
rsf = delta1*rsh + (1 - delta1)*rsm 
Fordism (delta1 = 0): rsf = rsm = rsf(-1) + rho1*(r(-1) - rsf(-1))  
Financialisation (delta1=1): rsf = rsh = rsf(-1)  
n = y_r / mju 
y_r = y/p 
un = npot - n 
npot = ypot_r/mju  
ypot = k / sigma 
ypot_r = k_r / sigma 
ur = un / npot 
theta = (rs*sigma)/(us - rs*sigma) 
ft = (theta  / (1 + theta))  * y  
h = ft/y 
wb = w*n 
wb_r = wb / p 
ws = wb/y 
 
Firms’ investment and financing decisions:  
g = gamma0 - gamma1*rsf(-1) - gamma2*lev(-1) + gamma3*u(-1) 
Fordism: gamma1 = 0 
Financialisation: gamma2 = 0 
i_r = g * k_r(-1)   
k_r = k_r(-1) + i_r 
k = k_r*p 
lev  = lf/k 
lf  = lf(-1)  + i  - fu  - (e_s  - e_s(-1))  * pe 
fu  = ft  - fd  - il  * lf(-1) 
fd  = (1  - sf)  * (ft(-1)  - il(-1)  * lf(-2))  * (1  + g(-1)) 
e_s = e_s(-1) + x * i(-1) / pe 
u = y/ypot 
y = i + cons  
i = i_r*p   
r = ft/k 
sf = sf(-1) (Fordism)   
Financialisation: sf = sf(-1) - delta2*(rsf(-1) - r(-1)) + delta21*(levc(-1)-lev(-1)) 
 
  27x = x(-1) (Fordism) 
Financialisation: x = x(-1) - delta3*(rsf(-1)-r(-1)) + delta31*(levc(-1) - lev(-1)) 
 
Personal consumption and portfolio decisions: 
c_r = cw_r + cr_r 
cons = c_r * p  
cw = cw_r*p 
cr = cr_r*p 
cw_r = wb/p 
cr_r = beta1*(ydr_r_exp) + beta2*(v(-1)/p(-1)) 
ydr_r_exp  = (1+gy_r)*ydr_r(-1)   
gy = (ydr - ydr(-1)) / ydr(-1) 
gy_r = (ydr_r - ydr_r(-1)) / ydr_r(-1) 
v  = v(-1)  + ydr  - cr  + cg 
v_r = v/p 
cg  = (pe  - pe(-1))  * e_d(-1) 
e_d  = e_s 
e_exp = (lambda0 - lambda1 * rm + lambda2 * re_r(-1)) * v_exp - lambda3 * ydr_exp 
v_exp  = v(-1)  + ydr_exp  + cg_exp  - cr  
cg_exp = (1 + g(-1)) * cg(-1) 
pe = e_exp/e_d 
re  = (fd  + cg)  / (pe(-1)  * e_d(-1)) 
re_r  = re - pinfl  
ydr_r = ydr/p 
ydr = fd + fb + im*m_d(-1) 
ydr_exp = (1 + gy)*ydr(-1) 
 
Banks and further monetary variables: 
rm = im - pinfl 
il = (1 + thetab)*im  
rl = il - pinfl 
fb  = il  * l_s(-1)  - im  * m_s(-1) 
l_s = lf 
m_d  = m_d(-1)  + v  - v(-1)  - (e_d  - e_d(-1))  * pe  - (pe  - pe(-1))  * e_d(-1) 
m_s = l_s 
q  = (lf  + e_s  * pe)  / k 
 
  28References: 
 
Aglietta, M. Régulation et Crises du Capitalisme. Paris: Odile Jacob, coll. “Opus”, 
1997. 
Aglietta, M., and Rébérioux, A. Dérives du Capitalisme Financier. Paris: Éditions Al-
bin Michel, 2004. 
Amadeo, E. J. “Notes on Capacity Utilisation, Distribution and Accumulation.” Contri-
butions to Political Economy, 1986, 5, 83-94 
Bhaduri, A., Laski, K., and Riese, M. “A Model of Interaction between the Virtual and 
the Real Economy.” Metroeconomica, 2006, 57, 412-427. 
Boyer, R. “Is a Finance-led Growth Regime a Viable Alternative to Fordism? A 
preliminary analysis.” Economy and Society, 2000, 29, 111-145. 
Charles, S. “Corporate Debt, Variable Retention Rate and the Appearance of Financial 
Fragility.” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 2008, forthcoming 
Chick, V., and Caserta, M. “Provisional Equilibrium and Macroeconomic Theory.” In 
P.  Arestis, G. Palma, G., and M. Sawyer (eds.): Markets, Unemployment and 
Economic Policy. Essays in Honour of Geoff Harcourt, vol. 2, London and New 
York: Routledge, 1997, 223-237. 
Commendatore, P. “Are Kaleckian Models Relevant for the Long Run?” In N. 
Salvadori and C. Panico (eds.), Classical, Neoclassical and Keynesian Views on 
Growth and Distribution, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2006, 288-307. 
Cordonnier, L. “Le Profit sans l’Accumulation: la Recette du Capitalisme Gouverné par 
la Finance”, Innovations, Cahiers d’économie de l’innovation, 2006, 23, 79-108. 
Cordonnier, L., and Van de Velde, F.: “Financial Claims and the Glass Ceiling of Prof-
itability”, paper presented at the Workshop Financialization: Post-Keynesian Ap-
proaches, University of Lille 1 (April), 2008. 
Crotty, J. “Owner-Management Conflict and Financial Theories of Investment 
Instability: a Critical Assessment of Keynes, Tobin, and Minsky, Journal of Post 
Keynesian Economics, 1990, 12, 519-542. 
Dallery, T. “Post-Keynesian Theories of the Firm under Financialization”, paper pre-
sented at the Workshop Financialization: Post-Keynesian Approaches, University 
of Lille 1 (April), 2008. 
Davidson, P. Money and the Real World. London: Macmillan, 1972. 
Duménil, G., and Lévy, D. “Being Keynesian in the Short Term and Classical in the 
Long Term: the Traverse to Classical Long-Term Equilibrium”, The Manchester 
School of Economic and Social Studies, 1999, 67(6), 684-716. 
Dutt, A. K. “Stagnation, Income Distribution and Monopoly Power’, Cambridge Jour-
nal of Economics, 1984, 8, 25–40. 
Dutt, A. K. Growth, Distribution and Uneven Development. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990. 
Dutt, A.K. “Equilibrium, Path Dependence and Hysteresis in Post-Keynesian Models.” 
In P. Arestis, G. Palma, G., and M. Sawyer (eds.): Markets, Unemployment and 
Economic Policy. Essays in Honour of Geoff Harcourt, vol. 2, London and New 
York: Routledge, 1997, 238-253. 
Epstein, G.A.  “Political Economy and Comparative Central Banking.” Review of Radi-
cal Political Economics, 1992, 24: 1-30.Galbraith, J.K. The New Industrial State, 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967. 
Godley, W., and Lavoie, M. Monetary Economics. An Integrated Approach to Credit, 
Money, Income, Production and Wealth. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
  29Harrod, R.F. Towards a Dynamic Economics, London: Macmillan & Co, 1948. 
Hein, E. “Interest, Debt and Capital Accumulation - a Kaleckian Approach.” Interna-
tional Review of Applied Economics, 2006, 20, 337-352. 
Hein, E. “Interest Rate, Debt, Distribution and Capital Accumulation in a Post-
Kaleckian Model.” Metroeconomica, 2007, 57, 310-339. 
Hein, E., and van Treeck, T. “‘Financialisation’” in Post-Keynesian Models of Distribu-
tion and Growth – a Systematic Review.” IMK Working Paper, 2008, 10. 
Kaldor, N. “A Model of Economic Growth.” Economic Journal, 1957, 67, 591-624. 
Kalecki, M. “The Principle of Increasing Risk.” Economica, 1937, 4, 440-447. 
Keynes, J.M. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes, Economic Articles and 
Correspondence: Investment and Editorial, vol. 12, London: Macmillan, 1983. 
Krippner, G.R. “The Financialization of the American Economy.” Socio-Economic 
Review, 2005, 3, 173-208. 
Kurz, H.D. “Normal Positions and Capital Utilization.” Political Economy, 1986, 2 (1), 
37-54. 
Lavoie, M. Foundations of Post-Keynesian Economic Analysis, Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar, 1992. 
Lavoie, M. “The Kaleckian Model of Growth and Distribution and its neo-Ricardian 
and neo-Marxian Critiques.” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 1995, 19 (6), 789-
818. 
Lavoie, M. “Traverse, Hysteresis, and Normal Rates of Capacity Utilization in Kal-
eckian Models of Growth and Distribution”, Review of Radical Political Economics, 
1996, 28 (4), 113-147. 
Lavoie, M. “The Kaleckian Growth Model with Target Return Pricing and Conflict In-
flation.” In Setterfield, M. (ed.): The Economics of Demand-Led Growth, Chelten-
ham: Edward Elgar, 2002, 172-188. 
Lavoie, M. “Kaleckian Effective Demand and Sraffian Normal Prices: Towards a Rec-
onciliation’, Review of Political Economy, 2003, 15 (1), 53-74. 
Lavoie, M. “Surveying Short-run and Long-run Stability Issues with the Kaleckian 
Model of Growth, mimeo, 2008. 
Lavoie, M., and Godley, W. “Kaleckian Models of Growth in a Coherent Stock-Flow 
Monetary Framework: a Kaldorian View”, Journal of Post-Keynesian Economics, 
2001, 24 (2), 277-312. 
Lavoie, M., Rodriquez, G, and Seccareccia, M. “Similarities and Discrepancies in Post-
Keynesian and Marxist Theories of Investment: A Theoretical and Empirical Inves-
tigation”. International Review of Applied Economics, 2004, 18 (2), 127-149. 
Marglin, S.A., and Schor, J.B. The Golden Age of Capitalism. Reinterpreting the Post-
war Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Clarendon, 1990. 
Minsky, H.P. Stabilizing an Unstable Economy, New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1986. 
Missaglia, M. “Demand Policies for Long-run Growth: Being Keynesian Both in the 
Short Run and in the Long Run?” Metroeconomica, 2007, 58 (1), 74-94. 
Palley, T. “Financialization: What it is and Why it Matters.” IMK Working Paper, 2008, 
4. 
Palumbo, A., and Trezzini, A. “Growth Without Normal Capacity Utilization.” 
European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 2003, 10 (1), 109-135. 
Park, M. S. “Accumulation, Capacity Utilisation and Distribution.” Contributions to 
Political Economy, 1997, 16, 87-101. 
Robinson, J. The Accumulation of Capital, London: Macmillan, 1956.  
  30Robinson, J. Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth, London: Macmillan, 1962. 
Rowthorn, R. “Demand, Real Wages and Economic Growth”, Thames Papers in Politi-
cal Economy, autumn 1981, 1-39. 
Shaikh, A. “Economic Policy in a Growth Context: A Classical Synthesis of Keynes 
and Harrod.” Working Paper, http://homepage.newschool.edu/~AShaikh/
Skott, P. Conflict and Effective Demand in Economic Growth. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989. 
Skott, P. “Investment Functions, Stability and the Reserve Army of Labor’, Working 
paper, University of Massachusetts in Amherst, 2008.  
Skott, P., and Ryoo, S. Macroeconomic implications of financialization, Cambridge 
Journal of Economics, 2008, forthcoming. 
Stockhammer, E. “Shareholder value orientation and the investment-profit puzzle.” 
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 2005-6, 28, 193-215. 
Taylor, L. “A Stagnationist Model of Economic Growth.” Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 1985, 9: 383-403.  
van Treeck, T. “A Synthetic, Stock-Flow Consistent Macroeconomic Model of Finan-
cialisation”, IMK Working Paper, 2007, 6. 
Wood, A. A Theory of Profits. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975. 
 
  31 
Publisher: Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Hans-Böckler-Str. 39, 40476 Düsseldorf, Germany 
Phone: +49-211-7778-331, IMK@boeckler.de, http://www.imk-boeckler.de  
 





The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the IMK or the Hans-Böckler-Foundation. 
 
All rights reserved. Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that  
the source is acknowledged. 